Fortra GoAnywhere MFT Vulnerability

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SOC Informative Report

Document details

Title of the activity
Fortra GoAnywhere MFT Vulnerability

Summary
Report containing information about the vulnerability CVE-2024-0204, an authentication bypass in the Fortra GoAnywhere MFT service.

Target audience
SOC and SOC AdS representatives

Confidentiality level (Clear/Green/Amber/Amber+Strict/Red)
CLEAR

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Introduction

Fortra GoAnywhere MFT (Managed File Transfer) is a software used for secure file sharing between systems, employees, customers, and different companies.

The same service has already been in the spotlight last year, when it was targeted by the Cl0p ransomware group, which was able to exploit the zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-0669 to breach 130 organizations worldwide [1].

This time, another critical CVE, tracked as **CVE-2024-0204**, is impacting the service.

NIST classification of the vulnerability [2]

Fortra released a security advisory on 22 January 2024 [3], revealing the critical vulnerability. The discovery date was 01 December 2023, and the vulnerability was patched a few days later with the release of **GoAnywhere MFT 7.4.1**. However, the company did not disclose any information at the time.

Overview of the attack

The **CVE-2024-0204** is an authentication bypass that allows an unauthorized user to create an admin user via the administration portal.

Researchers at Horizon3 published a Deep-Dive report [4] related to the vulnerability. We summarized it here below:

When installing GoAnywhere, the application will first direct users to the endpoint endpoint */InitialAccountSetup.xhtml* to set up a new **administrative user**.

After the configuration is completed, it's not possible to access the initial account configuration page again. If the user attempts to access this page, they are redirected either to the login form */auth/Login.xhtml* (if they are not authenticated), or to the welcome dashboard */Dashboard.xhtml*.

However, researchers discovered that it's possible to access the *InitialAccountSetup.xhtml* file again with a path traversal attempt containing the string */..;/*.

Thus, making a request to a vulnerable URL like this:

https://IP:PORT/goanywhere/images/...;/wizard/InitialAccountSetup.xhtml

allows anyone to access the initial configuration page and create a new user account with administrator privileges.

As proof of the attack's feasibility, researchers wrote and published a **Proof-of-Concept** (PoC) exploit, capable of creating an administrator account in vulnerable versions of GoAnywhere MFT. The PoC is available on GitHub [5].

All a cybercriminal needs in order to exploit the vulnerability is to specify a new account name, a password and the vulnerable endpoint.

Remediation

The affected versions of the product are the following:

- Fortra GoAnywhere MFT 6.x from 6.0.1
- Fortra GoAnywhere MFT 7.x before 7.4.1

Upgrading to version 7.4.1 or higher will successfully remove the vulnerability.

Workarounds

According to Fortra's advisory, the vulnerability may also be eliminated in these ways:

- For non-container deployments, delete the `InitialAccountSetup.xhtml` file in the installation directory and restart the services,
- For container-deployed instances, delete the `InitialAccountSetup.xhtml` file in the installation directory and replace it with an empty file, then restart the services.

Attack surface

Using a device search engine such as **Shodan**, it is possible to check the amount of devices that expose a GoAnywhere Web client on the Internet and are publicly reachable.

Below are the devices found with the Shodan query (search date 05/02/2024):

Shodan Query
html:"InvalidBrowser.xhtml"



IOCs

- Review the **Admin Users group** in the administrative console and look for new additions. If the attacker's account is present, you may be able to see its last logon activity.

- Review **database logs** and look for entries indicating new user creation.
    - *\GoAnywhere\userdata\database\goanywhere\log*.log*

Bibliography

[1]https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/clop-ransomware-claims-it-breached-130-orgs-using-goanywhere-zero-day/

[2]https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0204

[3]https://www.fortra.com/security/advisory/fi-2024-001

[4]https://www.horizon3.ai/cve-2024-0204-fortra-goanywhere-mft-authentication-bypass-deep-dive/

[5]https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2024-0204